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 1 Introduction
Non-compete covenants are clauses in contracts that expressly prohibit individuals from
competing with their former employers. They have become a common feature of employment
contracts, particularly for technical workers and upper-level management. In the United
States, for example, surveys report that nearly 90% of these employees have signed non-
compete agreements (Leonard 2001; Kaplan and Stromberg 2003).
Though nearly ubiquitous, the enforcement of these agreements nevertheless varies from
state to state. Some states, such as California, disregard them except in rare cases, while
other states, such as Massachusetts, generally enforce them (Gilson 1999). Though these
dierences almost invariably stem from state-level statutes or precedents that long precede
the modern usage of non-compete covenants, these dierences may nonetheless inuence the
economic climate and vitality of regions to the present day. Gilson (1999), for example, has
forwarded this dierence in legal infrastructure as the crucial factor behind Silicon Valley's
surpassing of the Boston area as the capital of high technology.
Despite the potential importance of this issue, however, little research has considered
systematically how the enforcement of non-compete agreements aects regional economies
as a whole. Evidence does exist that the non-enforcement of non-competes, which we refer to
as an \employee-friendly" regime, increases mobility. Fallick et al. (2006), Garmaise (2008)
and Marx et al. (2009), for example, report higher levels of mobility among executives and
technical workers in states with employee-friendly regimes. Similarly, Stuart and Sorenson
(2003) nd that these states have higher rates of biotech entrepreneurship following acquisi-
tions and IPOs in the industry. Given that non-compete covenants limit employees' outside
options, these ndings seem unsurprising. But one cannot conclude from them that states
should void these agreements.
2Non-compete covenants also have a positive side. They help companies to protect their
investments in human capital, intellectual property and relationships. Companies can of-
ten increase their productivity by training their workers, by developing new products and
processes, and by building valuable relationships with customers and suppliers. But these
investments carry with them the risk that some employee (or group of employees) might
leave the rm, taking these valuable skills and contacts with them. By restricting mobility,
non-compete covenants help to ensure that companies can reap the rewards of their invest-
ments. Employee-friendly regimes may therefore unintentionally encourage companies to
underinvest in human, intellectual and relational capital (Franco and Mitchell 2008). Hence,
the overall eect of non-compete clauses on the broader economy remains an open question.
It remains open in part because it has only recently received attention, but also in
part because of the empirical diculties surrounding it. Most notably, the variation in
enforcement exists almost entirely in the cross-section. With few exceptions, regions have had
stable legal regimes with respect to the enforcement of non-compete covenants for decades
(Richey and Malsberger 1996; Gilson 1999). Even states that have shifted their stances
have generally made only minor adjustments in their enforcement of them. But any analysis
relying entirely on cross-sectional variation in these legal regimes would have great diculty
distinguishing the eects of the enforcement of non-compete covenants from the multitude
of unmeasured factors that might confound such an estimate.
We address this issue through an indirect route. In particular, we exploit variation over
time in the availability of venture capital to estimate the net eect of these legal regimes.1
Venture capital stimulates entrepreneurship. Because potential entrepreneurs face fewer
1Our approach builds on the empirical approach of Samila and Sorenson (2010). They nd that the
supply of venture capital increases entrepreneurship and economic growth. Here, we explore the moderating
eect of non-compete covenants.
3constraints in states with employee-friendly legal regimes, one would expect venture capital
to have even stronger eects on entrepreneurship in these jurisdictions. The more interesting
question is: How does this increase in entrepreneurship aect the economy, and does that
eect dier across regimes?
Using panel data on metropolitan areas in the United States from 1993 to 2002, we
estimate the causal eect of venture capital on patenting, entrepreneurship, employment
and economic growth for states that do and do not restrict non-compete covenants. We
instrument for the availability of venture capital with a variable related to venture capital
fundraising but not (directly) to entrepreneurship: endowment returns. To maintain their
optimal asset allocations, institutional investors must adjust their commitments to venture
capital in response to the performance of the rest of their portfolios. These past portfo-
lio returns should, however, not directly inuence future regional dierences in innovation,
entrepreneurship or economic growth.
Our results suggest that non-compete covenants strongly moderate the eect of venture
capital on start-up activity, as well as on the economy as a whole. In states with employee-
friendly legal regimes, increases in the availability of venture capital result in larger increases
in the level of entrepreneurship in the region, consistent with prior studies that have found
a negative relationship between non-compete covenants and mobility (Stuart and Sorenson
2003; Fallick et al. 2006; Garmaise 2008; Marx et al. 2009). An inux of venture capital also
leads to higher levels of patenting and of employment in employee-friendly jurisdictions.
By providing evidence for the moderating eects of non-compete covenants on the eec-
tiveness of venture capital in fostering entrepreneurship and economic growth, we contribute
to a better understanding of the relationships between both venture capital and legal insti-
tutions and regional economic dynamics. This interaction also has at least three important
4implications. Most immediately, it suggests that policies aimed at stimulating entrepreneur-
ship through increases in the supply of venture capital may not succeed if the labor laws in
the jurisdiction do not support such investments. If other entrepreneurs behave similarly to
those backed by venture capital, this interaction further suggests that states could benet
broadly by relaxing their enforcement of non-compete agreements. More generally, it suggests
that legal infrastructures importantly moderate the eectiveness of nancial intermediation
and inuence the dynamics of regional industrial clusters.
2 Non-Compete Covenants
Non-compete covenants stipulate that employees may not work for competing rms, includ-
ing start-ups, if they leave their jobs. These agreements have become nearly standard in
employment contracts among certain sorts of employees, including executives, research and
development sta, and salespeople.
Though non-compete clauses have become common, their enforcement varies from state to
state.2 The majority of states enforce these agreements by the \rule of reason" |considering
an agreement valid if it does not prevent the individual from being gainfully employed
and if it does not appear longer in duration or broader in scope than necessary to protect
the prior employer (Gilson 1999). But many states also restrict non-compete agreements.
At the extreme, several states have statutes or precedents that essentially preclude their
enforcement. For example, California's Business and Professions Code x16600 states that
\every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade,
or business of any kind is to that extent void." Courts have interpreted this statute as
2In the United States, states have jurisdiction over labor law. For summaries of the enforcement of non-
compete covenants by state, see Stuart and Sorenson (2003, p. 190) and Garmaise (2008, p. 44). For more
detailed descriptions, see Richey and Malsberger (1996).
5invalidating not just clauses that would prevent, but even those that would merely penalize,
post-employment competition (Gilson 1999).
These state-level dierences in enforcement regimes generally have deep historical roots.3
In Massachusetts, for example, its origins reach back to English common law from the time of
the guilds (Gilson 1999). The California Business and Professions Code, meanwhile, emerged
in the nineteenth century from the newly-established state's need to create a consistent legal
code. Though the reasons why these statutes and precedents have been adopted have often
been lost to history, they do not appear to have arisen from any concern over their eects
on entrepreneurship or innovation (Gilson 1999).
Despite their deep historical roots, the consequences of these enforcement regimes con-
tinue to the present day. The enforcement of covenants not to compete has been shown to
restrict the mobility of employees (Fallick et al. 2006; Garmaise 2008; Marx et al. 2009) and
to reduce the rate of entrepreneurship (Stuart and Sorenson 2003). Gilson (1999) speculates
that this labor market friction may even hinder economic growth. Policymakers might there-
fore wish to emulate California's employee-friendly regime. But the eect of this friction for
the economy as a whole remains an open question because the enforcement of these agree-
ments also strengthens the incentives for rms to invest in certain sorts of assets (Franco
and Mitchell 2008).
3Most states have had stable enforcement regimes for decades. Three states have nevertheless experienced
meaningful changes in their enforcement over the last 30 years. In 1985, Michigan's legislature unintentionally
eliminated the statute that made non-compete agreements unenforceable in that state (Marx et al. 2009).
From 2002 to 2003, a ruling from the Louisiana Supreme Court made non-compete covenants unenforceable
in Louisiana, except as a barrier to the founding of a competing rm (Long 2005). And though Florida has
always enforced non-compete clauses, in 1996, the state legislature modestly strengthened this enforcement
(Garmaise 2008).
62.1 Incentives to invest
To the extent that non-compete covenants restrict the mobility of employees, they encourage
rms to invest in certain assets, such as intellectual property, human capital and inter-rm
relations. These incentives stem from two common features: (1) the control of these assets,
to a large extent, resides in individuals within the rm, and (2) rms have few alternative
mechanisms for protecting investments in these assets. Companies must therefore worry that
employees might appropriate these assets' value either by leaving or threatening to leave their
jobs. At the regional level, the enforcement of non-compete covenants could therefore stim-
ulate growth if companies focus their investments in regions that provide greater protection
over these investments.
Intellectual property: The most commonly discussed justication for enforcing non-
compete agreements is to protect intellectual property rights. Although companies can
often protect inventions { discrete, codiable entities { with patents, much innovation comes
in the form of tacit knowledge: routines and practices that are not easy to codify. This
knowledge can contribute crucially to the eciency of rms and may serve as a source of
competitive advantage. Yet, its tacit nature means that rms cannot easily separate it from
the individuals in which it resides. Not only does this fact open the possibility that this
knowledge may spill over to other rms (should employees with the knowledge defect to
them), but also it means that a rm could even lose the ability to access this asset itself (if
all of those with the knowledge left). Where enforced, non-compete clauses give the employer
eective property rights over this tacit knowledge (Gilson 1999).
Even when companies have alternative mechanisms for protecting their intellectual prop-
erty, the enforcement of non-compete covenants might still strengthen these protections.
7Consider patents, for example. The rights to an invention generally belong to the inven-
tor's employer. But courts consider an invention to have occurred when the inventor rst
conceives of the complete invention, supported by objective evidence (Gilson 1999). Hence,
an employee who leaves his or her employer before fully developing an invention { or before
creating the evidence to support it { can retain the property rights to it. When facing an
enforceable non-compete clause, however, the inability of the inventor to bring that invention
to a startup or to a competing rm would limit the inventor's temptation to pursue the idea
outside his or her current employer.
Human capital: Long (2005) and Garmaise (2008) draw attention to another form of
incentive. Non-compete covenants also protect investments in human capital. Firms can
improve their performance through the updating and upgrading of the human capital of
their labor forces. Concomitant to doing their jobs, for example, employees enhance their
ability to perform routine tasks through learning-by-doing. Employers can even accelerate
this acquisition of skills by assigning more experienced employees to mentor those learning
new tasks. Companies may even sponsor classes or compensate their workers for attending
courses outside of the workplace. Capelli (1999), for example, notes that employers now pay
for a large share of part-time college education.
Regardless of the source of this human capital, individual employees retain the rights to it
(Long 2005). When these upgrades involve the acquisition of abilities specic to the needs of
the employer, the rm can usually reap the rewards of these investments because employees
cannot benet from their human capital at other rms (Becker 1964). But more general
skills pose a problem. In the absence of a means of tying the employee to the rm, once
they have received the training, employees might market their newly-gained skills to other
rms, seeking higher salaries. Rational employers, recognizing this problem, will therefore
8refuse to invest in these more general skills|despite their value to the rm and to society
(Becker 1964).4 Enforceable non-compete covenants, however, may encourage employers to
invest more heavily in human capital.5
Business relationships: To intellectual and human capital, we would add a third asset
in which enforceable non-compete agreements provide incentives to invest: social capital.
Though business relationships have received little attention in the academic literature on
non-compete covenants, in practice companies appear to recognize their utility as a means
of protecting business relationships. These clauses, for example, appear commonly in the
contracts of salespeople, employees whose value resides almost entirely in their connections.
One also sees them often in professional services { such as accounting, consulting, law and
medicine { where relationships with clients play a particularly important role (Maister 1993).
A large literature in management and sociology has trumpeted the value of having trusted
social relationships. They can solve a sort of market failure in the sale of products and
services by connecting customers willing to pay for higher quality with the producers capable
of providing it (Kollock 1994). They can also improve the eciency of supply chains by
facilitating the exchange of ne-grained information and the coordination of joint problem-
solving across production stages (Uzzi 1996). Because of these benets, companies invest
valuable resources in building and maintaining business relationships.
Despite the evidence of their value, however, the ownership of these relationships remains
somewhat ambiguous. Although the literature conceptualizes inter-rm relationships as
4A literature on the design of incentives has sought solutions to this problem. To some extent, companies
can protect their investments by adopting pay structures that either increase over time or that contain
a large contingent component (Pakes and Nitzan 1983; Franco and Filson 2006; Men 2005). But these
compensation strategies increase the cost of these investments and therefore may still discourage them.
5Garmaise (2008) points out that the enforcement of non-compete covenants reduces the employee's own
incentives in invest in human capital. As a result, the expected net eect of non-compete enforcement on
human capital investment remains indeterminant.
9belonging to organizations, these connections, and the trust imbued in them, commonly
reside with the individuals anchoring each end of the relationship (Lv as and Rogan 2005).
Firms therefore frequently see these ties transfer to their competitors when employees defect.
Salespeople, accountants, consultants, doctors and lawyers, for example, bring clients with
them when they move to a new rm or set up their own practice. Where enforced, non-
compete clauses eectively allocate property rights over these relationships to the employer,
and therefore may encourage companies to invest more into developing them.
2.2 Impediments to growth
Though the enforcement of non-compete covenants can encourage companies to invest in an
array of assets, it may also impede growth in at least three ways: (i) through the slowing of
spillovers, (ii) through the reduction of entrepreneurship, and (iii) through a loss of eciency
in the matching of employees to employers.
The literature on non-compete agreements has pointed most prominently to spillovers
as a reason why regions might not want to enforce them. As noted above, much of the
knowledge that rms create is tacit and embodied in individuals. The diusion of this
knowledge across rms therefore depends on the movement of employees. To the extent that
many rms might benet from the ideas initially developed at (and paid for by) one rm,
this knowledge sharing can improve the competitiveness of a region. But this sharing faces
a collective action problem: Each company wants to prevent its own employees from leaving
but wants to enjoy spillovers by hiring the former employees of other rms (Combes and
Duranton 2006). By refusing to enforce non-compete clauses, jurisdictions can solve this
collective action problem and promote spillovers (Gilson 1999).
The enforcement of non-compete covenants also limits entrepreneurship. Though some
10simply see this eect as another form of spillover (from incumbent rms to startups), non-
compete agreements can also stymie entrepreneurial innovation (Hellmann 2007). Even
though a large share of entrepreneurs enter the industries of their former employers (Franco
and Filson 2006), many pursue novel lines of business (Klepper 2007). The enforcement of
non-compete agreements could nonetheless inhibit such entrepreneurship for at least two rea-
sons. First, entrepreneurs, even if pursuing ideas distinct from that of their former employers
and developed on the entrepreneur's own time, could face hold-up (Hellmann 2007). Second,
even if non-compete clauses do not prevent them personally from starting their ventures,
entrepreneurs might nd it far more dicult to get their organizations o the ground if they
cannot hire employees with experience in the industry because non-compete agreements bind
those potential hires (Stuart and Sorenson 2003).
Finally, by limiting mobility, non-compete clauses, when enforced, might reduce the
average quality of matches between employees and employers. If one assumes that employees
dier and that rms vary in the abilities and attributes that they require from employees,
then the matching of employees to employers can importantly inuence the productivity of
companies and regions (Roy 1951; Kremer 1993). But nding the right match often requires
a bit of experimentation. Individuals may not be aware of their own abilities and particularly
of how those abilities t with potential employers. Employers, similarly, may either fail to
understand completely what skills they require or nd themselves unable to assess those
qualities in job applicants. In the absence of perfect information, anything that adds friction
to the movement of employees across rms, therefore, will obstruct the trial-and-error process
and increase the odds of a poor match (e.g., Hopenhayn and Rogerson 1993).
113 Empirical Evidence
Although studies have examined how the enforcement of non-compete covenants inuences
employee mobility and entrepreneurship, the net eect of this enforcement on the economy
as a whole remains an open question. Part of the diculty in examining this issue comes
from the fact that few states have had meaningful changes in their legal regimes (see foot-
note 3). But a purely cross-sectional analysis cannot disentangle the eects of enforcement
from a host of other factors that vary across regions. By combining cross-sectional varia-
tion in enforcement with within-region variation on another important factor that inuences
entrepreneurship and economic growth, however, one can gain greater purchase on the im-
portance of these legal regimes.
Here, we exploit cross-sectional variation in the response of regions' economies to changes
in the supply of venture capital. Venture capital funds young, high-potential rms through
equity investments. By allocating capital to companies that otherwise would not receive
funding, venture capital rms stimulate entrepreneurship, employment and income growth
(Samila and Sorenson 2010). But do its eects vary across legal infrastructures? If the
incentives to innovate outweigh the impediments to growth, then one would expect venture
capital to have stronger positive eects on the economy in states that enforce non-compete
agreements. On the other hand, if the impediments to growth exceed the incentives to
innovate, then one would expect the opposite relationship.
Our empirical analysis uses an unbalanced panel of all 328 Metropolitan Statistical Ar-
eas (MSAs) in the contiguous United States from 1993 to 2002.6 MSAs oer the smallest
6The Oce of Management and Budget denes MSAs roughly three years after each decennial census.
The revised denitions from the 1990 census came into use in 1993 and remained in eect until 2002. We
limited our study to this ten-year window because consistent denitions of the areal units over time are
essential for our analyses.
12geographic regions that one might consider independent in terms of economic activity. Each
MSA consists of an urban core and a tightly integrated surrounding area (any county { or
township in the case of New England { in which more than 25% of the labor force commutes
to the urban core).
For each MSA, we gathered data from several sources, both public and private. The
economic data comes from the Small Business Administration, which collects it annually
from the Census Bureau. Our patent variables draw on the information available from the
National Bureau of Economic Research (Hall et al. 2001). The VentureXpert database of
Thomson-Reuters serves as our source of information on venture capital activity. To assess
state-level dierences in the enforcement of non-compete clauses, we used data from Stuart
and Sorenson (2003) and Garmaise (2008). Finally, information on endowment returns comes
from The Chronicle of Higher Education.
3.1 Dependent variables
To assess the eects of the enforcement of non-compete covenants, we created measures that
capture regional innovation, entrepreneurship, and economic health.
Patents: We use patents to assess innovation. Although we recognize that many kinds of
innovation do not appear in patenting data, patents nevertheless oer one of the few means
of measuring innovation across a broad spectrum of industries and over time. To create
our measure, we assigned each patent to an MSA based on the inventor's address and to a
year based on the date of application. If a patent had multiple inventors, we assumed that
they all participated equally in the invention and hence divided the patent equally across
the inventors' addresses.7 We counted the total number of patents in each MSA-year and
7Assigning patents to regions using only the addresses of the rst inventors produced equivalent results.
13transformed this count using the natural logarithm.
Establishment births: As a measure of entrepreneurship, we count the number of new
business establishments. The Census Bureau denes business establishments as single phys-
ical locations in which business occurs and for which employment records are maintained. It
records an establishment birth when a location had no employees in the pay period covering
March 12 in one year but has employees on the same date the following year. A rm may
have multiple establishments, but every rm has at least one.
One possible shortcoming of this measure is that it captures relocations and expansions
in addition to the creation of new rms. To focus on entrepreneurship, we used information
on the size of the rm creating the establishment. The Census Bureau reports establishment
births by three categories of rm size: 0-19 employees, 20-499 employees, and over 500
employees. It allocates rms to these categories based on their sizes at the end of the year.
Since few startups have more than 19 employees by the end of their rst year, we focused
on establishment births in the 0-19 employees category.8 Our measure transforms, by the
natural logarithm, the total number of establishments opened by rms with 0-19 employees
at the beginning of the year.
Employment and payroll: To assess the response of the economy as a whole to changes
in the supply of venture capital, we examined two additional outcomes: the total number
of people employed in the region, both full- and part-time, during the pay period covering
March 12, and their aggregate income, including all forms of compensation such as salaries,
wages, reported tips, employee contributions to pension plans, and the value of taxable
fringe benets during the calendar year. We transformed both variables using the natural
8This category will nonetheless include some relocations and expansions of very small businesses, adding
measurement error to our variable.
14logarithm to reduce their skewness.9
3.2 Independent variables
Non-compete enforcement: We created two measures of state-level dierences in the
enforcement of non-compete covenants (i.e. in the employee-friendliness of legal regimes).
The rst, ANC (for \absence of non-compete enforcement"), follows Stuart and Sorenson
(2003). In particular, we created a state-level indicator variable with a value of one if the
state generally precludes, through statute or precendents, the enforcement of non-compete
covenants (or zero otherwise). The second, WNC (for \weakness of non-compete enforce-
ment"), follows Garmaise (2008). For each state, Richey and Malsberger (1996) report
twelve summary provisions, such as whether the state imposes geographic or time limits
on the enforcement of non-compete agreements. Garmaise proposes a threshold value on
each provision that implies a more employee-friendly regime. This index simply counts the
number of employee-friendly provisions.10
To ease comparisons across these measures, we rescaled the second one to run from
0 to 1 (by dividing it by 9, the maximum value for any state). Higher values indicate
more employee-friendly legal regimes. Though these two variables correlate at 0.47, they
nonetheless each capture some unique variance in legal regimes and therefore we report
estimates using both measures.
9The Census Bureau reports establishment births and employment on an April-to-March calendar. We
therefore used venture capital investments from April of one year to March of the following year to predict the
entrepreneurship during the period and employment at the end of it. We also counted patents on an April-
March calendar. The payroll data, however, follows a January-to-December calendar. To keep the sample
consistent, we nevertheless decided to use the same measure of venture capital activity to predict changes
in income (limiting us to using only nine years of wage data). We did not have month-level information on
our instrumental and control variables, they therefore follow the normal calendar.
10In unreported analyses, we explored whether some of these provisions proved more important than others
in promoting entrepreneurship and economic growth. We nevertheless could not reject the null hypothesis
that each provision had equal importance in moderating the eect of venture capital.
15For MSAs that straddled two or more states, we weighted the state-level measures accord-
ing to the number of people in the MSA residing in each state. For example, an MSA with
60% of its population in a state that precludes the enforcement of non-compete covenants
(i.e. ANC = 1), and 40% in a state that does not (i.e. ANC = 0), would receive an ANC
value of 0.60. Our results nevertheless remain robust to the exclusion of these mixed MSAs.11
VC Investment Count: We measured venture capital activity by counting the number of
rms in a region that received venture capital nancing in each year. We only counted each
rm the rst time that it received an investment, and we only included investments from
venture capital rms organized as limited partnerships with outside investors.12 Although
angel investors, corporate venture capital, and direct investments by university endowments
and other investors undoubtedly also inuence the regional economy, our instrumental vari-
able constrains us to studying the eects of capital supplied by institutional investors. Table
1 presents summary statistics for this variable and the others used in our analysis, and Table
2 reports the regions with the highest average levels of venture capital and the most rapid
growth in venture capital over our observation window.
3.3 Fixed Eects Estimates
We began by estimating a standard production function:
lnYit =  + 1 lnPit + 2 lnV Cit + 3NCit lnV Cit + t + i + it; (1)
11Forty-one MSAs cross state boundaries.
12Although we only report the results using this count of rst investments, we experimented with a number
of alternative specications, including, for example, counting all investments and summing the dollars of
investments. All of these specications produced broadly consistent results.
16where i indexes the MSA and t indexes the year, Yit is the dependent variable (patent
applications, births of new establishments, employment level or total payroll), Pit measures
the population level, V Cit represents venture capital activity, NCit denotes the strength of
non-compete enforcement (ANC or WNC), t indicates a series of year xed eects, i
denotes the MSA xed eects (partialed out), and it represents the residual error.13 A
statistically signicant value for 3 would indicate that non-compete enforcement moderates
the eect of venture capital.
In all models, we included region-specic xed eects (i) to control for all time-invariant
aspects of each region, such as local institutions and tax laws, the presence of colleges and
universities, geographic factors, and the composition of the labor force. Using xed eects
eectively removes them from the models. Because non-compete enforcement does not vary
meaningfully within-MSAs over time, however, these xed eects also absorb the \main"
eect of non-compete enforcement and therefore we cannot estimate a coecient for it.
We also introduced year xed eects to control for all time-varying factors at the national
level, most notably stock market performance, interest rates, and other general economic
conditions. These would naturally inuence entrepreneurship, economic growth, and also
the rate of venture capital investing and fund raising. The year eects (t) eectively remove
these national economic factors from our analyses.
We therefore identify our eects from MSA-specic, within-MSA changes in venture
capital, innovation, entrepreneurship and economic growth. That means that only other
MSA-specic, within-MSA factors could possibly confound our results. We include one such
variable explicitly in the analysis, population (the logged count of individuals living in an
13Repeated observations of the same geographic units could lead to correlated errors over time within
regions. In ordinary least squares estimation, these correlations will not bias the estimates themselves, but
they can aect the estimated standard errors. We therefore estimated our models using standard errors
robust to repeated observations of the same regions.
17MSA), and deal with other unobserved factors below through the use of an instrument.
Let us turn to the estimation results, beginning with Table 3, which reports the results
for patents and new establishments. Because of the log-log specication, we can interpret
these coecients as elasticities. Thus, for example, a 1% increase in the number of rms
funded by venture capital rms in a region increases the number of patents in that region
by .03%. Or, for the interactions, a 1% increase in the number of rms funded by venture
capital rms in a region that does not enforce non-compete agreements increases the number
of patents in the region by .08% (= :0626 + :0223).
As expected, venture capital has positive eects on both outcomes (models 1 and 4).
When we examine the degree to which this varies across states as a function of their le-
gal regimes, however, we see slightly dierent patterns. Venture capital clearly appears
to have stronger eects on patenting in employee-friendly regimes. At least three factors
might account for this eect. First, the greater mobility of personnel in these jurisdictions
could stimulate innovation by better enabling the recombination of existing technologies into
new inventions (Fleming 2001). Second, rms may invest more in patentable R&D if the
movement of personnel limits their ability to compete on the basis of people (e.g., Garmaise
2008). Third, rms might attempt to substitute patents for the intellectual property protec-
tion oered by non-compete covenants. We therefore cannot say whether this eect reects
increased innovation (though it seems improbable that the positive coecient would appear
if innovation actually declined). Venture capital nevertheless appears more productive, in
terms of creating new rms, in employee-friendly regimes.
Table 4 reports the results of our xed eects estimates of the eect of venture capital on
employment and aggregate income. Consistent with past research, we nd positive eects
of venture capital on both outcomes. We also nd strong evidence that venture capital in-
18vestments produce larger gains in employment and in aggregate income in employee-friendly
jurisdictions. Though these estimates have fairly wide condence intervals, the larger size of
the coecient estimate for the WNC interactions in predicting payroll relative to employ-
ment suggests that the average wages in employee-friendly regimes may increase somewhat
in response to venture capital investments.
Tables 5 and 6 explore the temporal structure of the eects of venture capital. Venture
capital has the most immediate eects in terms of entrepreneurship. In part, that eect
probably stems from the funding of rms in their rst year. Though the average rm in
our data receives its rst round of venture capital in its third year, 29% of rms received
venture capital in their rst year of operation. But in part, it likely reects entry by would-
be entrepreneurs interpreting these investments as information about the probable future
availability of nancing (Samila and Sorenson 2010).
Venture capital has longer term eects in patenting and particularly in employment and
income. As the ventures funded by venture capital rms grow, they continue to contribute to
the economies of the regions in which they reside. The dierences in these eects according
to the employee-friendliness of the regime, moreover, continue to persist over time. Hence,
regions with more employee-friendly labor laws appear to enjoy lasting gains in terms of
employment and income.
Though our results are quite robust, one concern might be the extent to which Silicon
Valley drives them. California does not enforce non-compete agreements and our observation
window covers the period of the dot-com boom, which produced extraordinary short-run
growth in the San Francisco Bay Area. To examine whether this outlier might drive our
results, in Tables 7 and 8, we replicated Tables 3 and 4 excluding MSAs in the Bay Area|
San Francisco, San Jose, Fresno, and Oakland. Though the point estimates from this analysis
19suggest slightly smaller eect sizes, the pattern and signicance levels of the results remain
essentially robust to the exclusion of these MSAs.
3.4 IV Fixed Eects Estimates
The OLS results may nonetheless be biased for at least two reasons: reverse causality and
unobserved heterogeneity. On the one hand, venture capital rms may actively search for and
locate their oces in the regions with the highest levels of innovation, entrepreneurship and
economic growth. On the other hand, some unobserved MSA-specic, within-MSA factor
might confound our results.
We address both of these issues through the use of an instrumental variable: limited part-
ner (LP) returns. We also estimated models using the instrument suggested by Gompers and
Lerner (2000): investments in LBO funds. Though that instrument produces substantively
equivalent results, we prefer the LP returns instrument for two reasons. First, these returns
are more plausibly exogenous to regional economic activity (discussed further below). Insti-
tutions might invest in LBO funds in a region in response to the attractiveness of the local
economy. Second, LP returns has a stronger relationship to venture capital investments in
the rst stage, and therefore produces more ecient second-stage estimates.
LP Returns: Most institutional investors diversify their investments using a (relatively)
xed proportional allocation across dierent asset classes { for example, 40% equities, 40%
bonds, and 20% alternative assets { adjusting their investments towards this target allocation
at regular intervals. Given the limited maturity of venture capital investments, an increase
in returns to the total portfolio leads to a greater ow of funds into venture capital. Because
institutional investors exhibit a preference for geographically proximate private equity funds
(Samila and Sorenson 2010), the investment returns of local limited partners should at least
20partially determine the availability of venture capital in a region.
We construct our instument by interacting the national average returns to college and
university endowments, an important class of institutional investor, with the number of
limited partners in the region that had invested in private equity prior to 1993. Thus, for




ERs ln(1 + LPi); (2)
where ERs denotes the average returns to college endowments in year s, ln(1+LPi) denotes
the logged count of limited partners located in MSA i who had invested in any private equity
fund in 1992 or earlier (plus one to avoid zeros). We summed three years of inows to create
our instrument because venture capital rms typically invest the funds that they raise over
the rst few years of the partnership.
We made several choices in the construction of the instrument to ensure its validity.
First, instead of using the actual returns to limited partners in a region, we used the national
average returns for a year as a proxy for these returns. Since institutions often exhibit a
home bias in their portfolios, the strength of the local economy could contaminate the actual
local returns. Second, instead of using a time-varying count of limited partners in the region,
we xed this count at the number that invested in private equity prior to our observation
window. Again, a time-varying count of investors might reect the strength of the economy
if strong economies foster the formation of new institutional investors. Finally, we lagged the
time variable so that any year's investments depend on the previous (three) year's returns.
Given these precautions, we see no reason that our instrument would have a direct eect
on local innovation, entrepreneurship or economic growth. We also need not worry about re-
verse causality between the dependent variables and portfolio returns. Since venture capital
accounts for but a small portion of the total assets, approximately 1% for college and univer-
21sity endowments according to the Chronicle of Higher Education, the performance of venture
capital investments has little inuence on these overall returns. LP returns, therefore, should
oer a valid instrument for the local supply of venture capital.
Table 9 reports the rst-stage estimates for the instrumental variable and our measure of
venture capital activity. As expected, LP returns strongly predict venture capital activity.
The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic (Kleibergen and Paap 2006) tests whether our
instrument predicts a sucient amount of the variance to identify our equations. For two-
stage least-squares (2SLS) estimation with one instrument and one endogenous variable,
Stock and Yogo (2005) report a critical value of 16.38 for the IV estimates to have no more
than 10% of the bias of the OLS estimates. Our observed value of 160.62 clearly indicates
that we need not worry about instrument weakness.
To incorporate the interaction terms, we estimated the IV results in two stages.14 We rst
regressed venture capital activity on the instrument (LP returns), population, year dummies
and region xed eects, exactly as in the rst stage of a standard 2SLS estimation. We then
predicted the value of the venture capital measure using the estimated coecients and used
that prediction and its interaction with the enforcement of non-compete covenants (ANC
and WNC) in the second-stage regressions. Because OLS does not produce the correct
standard errors for predicted values, we estimated the standard errors by bootstrapping the
regression 10,000 times.
The results of these IV estimates appear in Tables 10 and 11. Beginning with the eects
on patenting and rm founding, we see a fairly consistent set of results. As in the OLS
estimates, venture capital has a positive eect on patenting in all states, but it has even
14An alternative approach for including an interaction with an instrumental variable involves instrumenting
both the endogenous variable, VC activity, and the interaction of the endogenous and exogenous variables
with the instrument and the interaction of the instrument with the exogenous variable. This approach
produced substantively equivalent results to the ones reported here.
22stronger eects in those states that do not enforce non-compete agreements. This dierence
is large. States that do not enforce them experience twice the increase in patents of those
that do enforce them in response to an inux of venture capital. We see the same pattern
in establishment births.
Turning to the broader regional economy, the results also support the tentative conclu-
sions from the OLS regressions: employee-friendly legal regimes signicantly amplify the
benecial eects of venture capital on employment. In fact, employee-friendly regimes enjoy
roughly three times the employment growth of rm-friendly regimes in response to venture
capital. A similar relationship appears to hold between venture capital and the aggregate
income in an MSA. In those models, however, the ineciency of the IV estimates has lead
to error margins that do not allow us to reject the null hypothesis that the eect of venture
capital on wages does not vary across regimes.
4 Discussion
Some scholars, such as Wood (2000), have questioned the importance of non-compete covenants,
suggesting that regions that enforce these agreements might have developed alternative
mechanisms for ensuring labor mobility and the associated knowledge spillovers. Our re-
sults strongly suggest otherwise. We nd that the enforcement of non-compete covenants
moderates the eects that venture capital has on both innovation and the overall regional
economy. More specically, our results demonstrate that not only does the enforcement of
non-compete agreements limit entrepreneurship, consistent with the earlier ndings of Stu-
art and Sorenson (2003), but also it appears to impede innovation. Although we cannot rule
out the possibility that patenting increases in these regions as rms attempt to substitute
patents for non-compete agreements as a means of protecting their intellectual property, it
23seems quite plausible that the value of the recombination of knowledge facilitated by the el-
evated mobility of individuals across rms might outweigh the greater incentives to innovate
aorded by the enforcement of these non-compete covenants.15
We further nd that regions as a whole benet from an employee-friendly legal regime
through greater employment. Here, it is interesting to consider the size of these eects.
Our estimates suggest that a doubling in the number of venture capital investments in an
average region would result in 15 to 36 more rms if the region did not enforce non-compete
agreements (depending on whether one uses the OLS or IV estimates). That same doubling
in investments predicts 3,607 to 5,350 more jobs in these employee-friendly jurisdictions. If
all of these jobs came from the startups, then the average startup would need to employ more
than 150 people. Since that number dramatically exceeds the actual scale of these rms, it
suggests that a substantial portion of the job growth in the regions with employee-friendly
regimes comes, not from the startups themselves, but from spillovers in the economy to
established rms. Both incumbents and entrants therefore may well benet from the greater
mobility of employees.
These results may tell us a great deal about why some regions appear to have beneted
more from venture capital than others. Several regional and national governments around
the world have attempted to grow local venture capital communities in the hope of mimicing
the success of dynamic regions such as Silicon Valley (Gilson 2003). The success of these
attempts, however, has been varied. Our estimates suggest that communities or states that
implement programs to promote venture capital without adopting supportive labor laws may
have little hope of seeing benets from these programs (even if they succeed in increasing
the level of venture capital activity).
15Garmaise (2008), on the other hand, nds some evidence that rms may actually invest less in R&D in
regimes of strong non-compete enforcement.
24But the results also oer hope for these regions. The fact that we nd similar eect
sizes in both our discrete and continuous measures of non-compete enforcement suggests
that jurisdictions need not adopt California's extreme stance to increase the ecacy of
venture capital. Rather, by incrementally adopting more employee-friendly provisions, it
would appear that states could gradually improve the regional returns to these investments.
In this sense, our results accord well with prior ndings, from China, that even relatively
minor institutional changes that improve the uidity of labor markets can have relatively
large eects on the eciency of an economy (Groves et al. 1994, 1995).
Heterogeneity in labor laws, moreover, may have even larger eects across countries
than it does across states within the United States. Consider the case of Canada, or more
specically Ontario. On the one hand, the province seems well suited to venture capital. Its
universities produce cutting edge research. It is home to high-tech industry leaders, such
as ATI and Research in Motion. Its government has done much to try to stimulate a local
venture capital community. Yet, the region appears to have yet to develop the dynamics
of a successful high-tech cluster. Part of the answer may reside in the way common law in
Canada eectively bars management-level employees from leaving to competing rms, even
in the absence of actual non-compete clauses. This broad interpretation of management's
duciary duty could have unintended consequences by eectively precluding the emergence
of spin-o rms and, concomitantly, of a self-sustaining cluster.
In this respect, our ndings also suggest a new research agenda. The literature analyz-
ing the eectiveness of attempts to stimulate venture capital have focused almost entirely
on the internal features of these programs, such as the incentives that they oer to the
professional investors (e.g., Gilson 2003). But the reasons why some government programs
have succeeded while others have failed may well reside outside of the programs themselves,
25and reect instead the broader institutional environments in which these policies have been
implemented. Labor law matters. Perhaps the eectiveness of venture capital depends on
other features of the environment as well, such as taxes, public support for research and
development, or even the degree of connectedness between the academic, business and nan-
cial communities. We therefore see a need for a research program that considers the broader
context as a potential catalyst for nancial capital.
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29Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Patents 242.92 550.98 2935
Births 1411.65 2507.39 2935
Population (thousands) 655.96 1097.15 2935
Employment (thousands) 273.88 475.95 2935
Payroll (millions) 8508.95 17872.22 2935
VC Count 4.34 28.49 2935
Absence of NC 0.18 0.38 2935
Weakness of NC 0.52 0.23 2935
LP Returns 23.29 38.29 2935
30Table 2: Most active and fastest growing regions for venture capital
Avg rst investments per year Avg CAGR per year, 93-01
San Jose, CA 254 Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 43%
San Francisco, CA 195 Pittsburgh, PA 35%
Boston, MA-NH 163 Baltimore, MD 32%
New York, NY 91 New York, NY 29%
Oakland, CA 76 Austin-San Marcos, TX 29%
Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV 74 Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc, CA 26%
San Diego, CA 65 Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 26%
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 63 Albuquerque, NM 22%
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA 60 Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NJ 22%
Atlanta, GA 48 Lawrence, MA-NH 22%
Table 3: FE Estimates for Innovation and Entrepreneurship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Patents Patents Patents Births Births Births
Ln Population 1.466 1.470 1.484 0.827 0.827 0.829
(4.56) (4.56) (4.63) (10.32) (10.31) (10.30)
Ln VC Cnt 0.0332 0.0223 0.0329 0.00862 0.00596 0.00858
(3.67) (2.37) (3.73) (2.75) (1.70) (2.74)
Ln VC Cnt x ANC 0.0626 0.0152
(2.76) (2.42)
Ln VC Cnt x WNC 0.104 0.0156
(3.40) (1.58)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.24 0.24 0.24
Clusters 328 328 328 328 328 328
Observations 2935 2935 2935 2935 2935 2935
Notes: OLS regression results; * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. Robust t-statistics
in parentheses; disturbances clustered by MSA. The unit of observation is the MSA-year
and the data cover the 48 contiguous United States from 1993 to 2002. In models 1-3 the
dependent variable is the count of patent applications. In models 4-6 the dependent variable
is births of new establishments for rms with 0-19 employees at the beginning of the year.
31Table 4: FE Estimates for Regional Economy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Emplmnt Emplmnt Emplmnt Payroll Payroll Payroll
Ln Population 0.785 0.786 0.789 1.139 1.140 1.144
(21.10) (21.24) (21.35) (15.23) (15.19) (15.39)
Ln VC Cnt 0.00767 0.00438 0.00762 0.0229 0.0198 0.0228
(4.53) (2.43) (4.57) (7.09) (5.54) (7.19)
Ln VC Cnt x ANC 0.0188 0.0177
(4.93) (1.84)
Ln VC Cnt x WNC 0.0211 0.0324
(3.31) (2.48)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.93 0.93 0.93
Clusters 328 328 328 328 328 328
Observations 2935 2935 2935 2935 2935 2935
Notes: OLS regression results; * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. Robust t-statistics
in parentheses; disturbances clustered by MSA. The unit of observation is the MSA-year
and the data cover the 48 contiguous United States from 1993 to 2002. In models 1-3 the
dependent variable is the total employment in the MSA. In models 4-6 the dependent variable
is the total payroll in the MSA.
32Table 5: FE Estimates for Innovation and Entrepreneurship with Lag Structure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Patents Patents Patents Births Births Births
Ln Population 1.397 1.398 1.443 0.812 0.811 0.816
(4.25) (4.24) (4.44) (9.96) (9.90) (9.93)
Ln VC Cnt (t) 0.0262 0.0217 0.0247 0.00715 0.00550 0.00707
(3.38) (2.51) (3.27) (2.55) (1.74) (2.54)
Ln VC Cnt (t-1) 0.0159 0.00633 0.0147 0.00236 0.00154 0.00222
(1.88) (0.71) (1.71) (0.95) (0.56) (0.90)
Ln VC Cnt (t-2) 0.00714 -0.00154 0.00652 0.00226 0.00108 0.00216
(0.81) (-0.16) (0.75) (0.79) (0.35) (0.76)
Ln VC Cnt (t-3) 0.0185 0.0137 0.0182 0.00442 0.00256 0.00443
(2.12) (1.49) (2.19) (1.42) (0.75) (1.43)
Ln VC Cnt x ANC (t) 0.0262 0.00966
(1.55) (1.73)
Ln VC Cnt x ANC (t-1) 0.0523 0.00390
(2.91) (0.72)
Ln VC Cnt x ANC (t-2) 0.0490 0.00667
(2.90) (1.00)
Ln VC Cnt x ANC (t-3) 0.0236 0.0106
(1.27) (1.46)
Ln VC Cnt x WNC (t) 0.0588 0.0120
(2.00) (1.41)
Ln VC Cnt x WNC (t-1) 0.0563 -0.000104
(1.86) (-0.01)
Ln VC Cnt x WNC (t-2) 0.0656 0.000402
(2.00) (0.05)
Ln VC Cnt x WNC (t-3) 0.0228 0.00876
(0.62) (0.79)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.24 0.25 0.25
Clusters 328 328 328 328 328 328
Observations 2935 2935 2935 2935 2935 2935
Notes: OLS regression results; * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. Robust t-statistics
in parentheses; disturbances clustered by MSA. The unit of observation is the MSA-year
and the data cover the 48 contiguous United States from 1993 to 2002. In models 1-3 the
dependent variable is the count of patent applications. In models 4-6 the dependent variable
is births of new establishments for rms with 0-19 employees at the beginning of the year.
33Table 6: FE Estimates for Regional Economy with Lag Structure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Emplmnt Emplmnt Emplmnt Payroll Payroll Payroll
Ln Population 0.770 0.770 0.779 1.060 1.059 1.077
(20.60) (20.69) (20.86) (15.34) (15.25) (15.56)
Ln VC Cnt (t) 0.00623 0.00398 0.00588 0.0153 0.0142 0.0145
(4.45) (2.63) (4.21) (7.20) (6.08) (6.97)
Ln VC Cnt (t-1) 0.00474 0.00360 0.00446 0.0160 0.0138 0.0154
(3.58) (2.47) (3.29) (6.45) (5.37) (6.29)
Ln VC Cnt (t-2) 0.00194 0.000577 0.00185 0.0162 0.0139 0.0161
(1.44) (0.40) (1.37) (6.04) (4.75) (6.16)
Ln VC Cnt (t-3) 0.00115 -0.000179 0.00114 0.0115 0.00857 0.0116
(0.80) (-0.13) (0.83) (4.93) (3.34) (5.19)
Ln VC Cnt x ANC (t) 0.0131 0.00651
(4.42) (1.23)
Ln VC Cnt x ANC (t-1) 0.00565 0.0117
(1.86) (1.67)
Ln VC Cnt x ANC (t-2) 0.00796 0.0123
(2.53) (2.05)
Ln VC Cnt x ANC (t-3) 0.00716 0.0164
(1.86) (3.28)
Ln VC Cnt x WNC (t) 0.0115 0.00737
(2.10) (0.91)
Ln VC Cnt x WNC (t-1) 0.00877 0.0212
(2.06) (2.11)
Ln VC Cnt x WNC (t-2) 0.0140 0.0263
(2.85) (3.31)
Ln VC Cnt x WNC (t-3) 0.00853 0.0229
(1.35) (3.21)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.94 0.94 0.94
Clusters 328 328 328 328 328 328
Observations 2935 2935 2935 2935 2935 2935
Notes: OLS regression results; * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. Robust t-statistics
in parentheses; disturbances clustered by MSA. The unit of observation is the MSA-year
and the data cover the 48 contiguous United States from 1993 to 2002. In models 1-3 the
dependent variable is the total employment in the MSA. In models 4-6 the dependent variable
is the total payroll in the MSA.
34Table 7: FE Estimates for Innovation and Entrepreneurship excl. Silicon Valley
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Patents Patents Patents Births Births Births
Ln Population 1.467 1.469 1.478 0.824 0.825 0.826
(4.55) (4.55) (4.61) (10.26) (10.25) (10.25)
Ln VC Cnt 0.0289 0.0232 0.0295 0.00797 0.00607 0.00806
(3.29) (2.46) (3.41) (2.52) (1.73) (2.54)
Ln VC Cnt x ANC 0.0368 0.0122
(1.86) (1.81)
Ln VC Cnt x WNC 0.0736 0.0111
(2.67) (1.06)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.24 0.24 0.24
Clusters 324 324 324 324 324 324
Observations 2899 2899 2899 2899 2899 2899
Notes: OLS regression results; * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. Robust t-statistics
in parentheses; disturbances clustered by MSA. The unit of observation is the MSA-year
and the data cover the 48 contiguous United States from 1993 to 2002. In models 1-3 the
dependent variable is the count of patent applications. In models 4-6 the dependent variable
is births of new establishments for rms with 0-19 employees at the beginning of the year.
Silicon Valley consists of the San Francisco, San Jose, Oakland, and Fresno MSAs.
35Table 8: FE Estimates for Regional Economy w/o Silicon Valley
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Emplmnt Emplmnt Emplmnt Payroll Payroll Payroll
Ln Population 0.784 0.785 0.787 1.143 1.143 1.146
(21.05) (21.16) (21.24) (15.29) (15.27) (15.35)
Ln VC Cnt 0.00702 0.00448 0.00717 0.0212 0.0201 0.0214
(4.16) (2.47) (4.28) (6.74) (5.62) (6.79)
Ln VC Cnt x ANC 0.0164 0.00712
(4.18) (0.88)
Ln VC Cnt x WNC 0.0172 0.0204
(2.62) (1.74)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.94 0.94 0.94
Clusters 324 324 324 324 324 324
Observations 2899 2899 2899 2899 2899 2899
Notes: OLS regression results; * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. Robust t-statistics
in parentheses; disturbances clustered by MSA. The unit of observation is the MSA-year
and the data cover the 48 contiguous United States from 1993 to 2002. In models 1-3
the dependent variable is the total employment in the MSA. In models 4-6 the dependent
variable is the total payroll in the MSA. Silicon Valley consists of the San Francisco, San
Jose, Oakland, and Fresno MSAs.








MSA Fixed Eects Yes
R2 0.22
KP Wald F-statistic 160.62
Clusters 328
Observations 2935
Notes: First-stage of IV estimation; * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. Robust
t-statistics in parentheses; disturbances clustered by MSA. The unit of observation is the
MSA-year and the data cover the 48 contiguous United States from 1993 to 2002. The
dependent variable is the count of rst VC investments in the MSA.
36Table 10: IV Estimates for Innovation and Entrepreneurship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Patents Patents Patents Births Births Births
Population 1.305 1.292 1.325 0.780 0.776 0.786
(4.00) (3.97) (4.08) (9.11) (8.94) (8.90)
VC Cnt (p) 0.124 0.0949 0.118 0.0352 0.0274 0.0331
(3.43) (2.64) (3.23) (2.84) (1.97) (2.45)
VC Cnt (p) x ANC 0.138 0.0367
(2.33) (2.02)
VC Cnt (p) x WNC 0.116 0.0399
(1.05) (1.22)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.24 0.25 0.25
Clusters 328 328 328 328 328 328
Observations 2935 2935 2935 2935 2935 2935
Notes: 2SLS regression results; * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. Bootstrapped t-
statistics in parentheses. The unit of observation is the MSA-year and the data cover the
48 contiguous United States from 1993 to 2002. In models 1-3 the dependent variable is
the count of patent applications. In models 4-6 the dependent variable is births of new
establishments for rms with 0-19 employees at the beginning of the year.
37Table 11: IV Estimates for Regional Economy with Absence of NC Binary
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Emplmnt Emplmnt Emplmnt Payroll Payroll Payroll
Population 0.772 0.769 0.780 1.045 1.042 1.054
(16.24) (15.96) (16.20) (13.01) (12.77) (12.98)
VC Cnt (p) 0.0154 0.00946 0.0127 0.0761 0.0708 0.0733
(3.08) (1.74) (2.51) (6.55) (6.51) (6.78)
VC Cnt (p) x ANC 0.0278 0.0249
(2.69) (0.95)
VC Cnt (p) x WNC 0.0524 0.0544
(3.11) (1.41)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.93 0.93 0.93
Clusters 328 328 328 328 328 328
Observations 2935 2935 2935 2935 2935 2935
Notes: 2SLS regression results; * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. Bootstrapped t-
statistics in parentheses. The unit of observation is the MSA-year and the data cover the
48 contiguous United States from 1993 to 2002. In models 1-3 the dependent variable is the
total employment in the MSA. In models 4-6 the dependent variable is the total payroll in
the MSA.
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